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THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF 
INDEPENDENCE IN LATIN AMERICA 
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In his classic work on Latin America, Victor Bulmer-Thomas concludes, 
"The economic development of Latin America since independence is a 
story of unfulfilled promise," and stresses that "the gap between living 
standards in Latin America and those in the developed countries has steadily 
widened since the early nineteenth century.'" This view has been qualified 
by Step hen Haber, who pointed out that the income gap between Latin 
America and Anglo-Saxon America "is not a product of the twentieth 
century."2 John Coatsworth, in turn, added that today's Latin American 
underdevelopment arose during the colonial era and in the aftermath of 
independence.3 Evidence on levels of per capita income supports the view 
that Latin America as a whole did not worsen its position relative to the 
United States during the twentieth century (Table 13.1). 
Independence, achieved in most of Latin America between 1808 and 
1825, and the resulting insertion into the international economy (a long 
process that gathered momentum between 1850 and 1873) appear as the 
I Victor Bulmer-Thomas, The Economic History of Latin America since Independence, 2nd ed. 
(Cambridge, 2003), 392. This essay focuses exclusively on the effects of independence on economic 
performance and does not address the background to struggles for independence. A comprehensive 
coverage of the process of independence and its aftermath can be found in Leslie Bethell, ed., The 
Cambridge History of Latin America (Cambridge, 1985), vo!. 3. I have received useful advice from the 
editors. I would also like to acknowledge Jeremy Adelman, Bob AlIen, Stan Engerman, Alejandra 
Irigoin, Hector Lindo-Fuentes, Carlos Marichal, Alfonso Quiroz, Joan Roses, and especially Patrick 
O'Brien for their comments. I am solely responsible for any remaining errors. 
2 Stephen Haber, ed., How Latin America Fell Behind. Essays on the Economic Histories of Brazil and 
Mexico, I80o-I9I4 (Stanford, CA, '997), I. 
3 My italics. John H. Coatsworth, "Notes on the Comparative &onomic History of Latin America 
and the United States," in Walther L. Bernecker and Hans Werner Tobler, eds., Development and 
Underdevelopment in America: Contrasts in Economic Growth in North America and Latin America in 
Historical Perspective (New York, '993). 
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Table 13-1. Relative GDP per head in Latin America, I9oG-S 
Latin America (I970 $ PPP) Latin America (USA = IOO) 
Six countries All Six countries All 
1900 185 12·5 
1910 228 13-3 
1920 235 12·4 
1930 277 12·9 
1940 320 12·9 
1950 413 394 12·5 11.9 
1960 521 487 13.6 12·7 
1970 707 649 13·7 12.6 
1980 973 884 15·4 14.0 
1990 938 837 12·7 11.3 
1995 990 879 12.8 11.4 
Source: Pablo Astorga and Valpy Fitzgerald, "Statistical Appendix," in 
Rosemary Thorp, Progress, Poverty and Exclusion. An Economic History of 
Latin America in the 20th Century (Washington, DC, 1998), 353. 
two most important events in assessments of economic performance in 
nineteenth-century Latin America.4 
However, no consensus exists on how independence came about. Was it 
the result of an external shock, such as the Napoleonic Wars and the French 
invasion of the Iberian peninsula? Was it a consequence of institutional 
inefficiency or, conversely, a reaction against reforms and modernization 
associated with the introduction of new liberal ideas and institutions in 
the metropolis and, hence, an endogenous phenomenon? Was it, perhaps, 
the outcome of the struggle against liberal reform and modernization in 
central colonies (Mexico and Peru), whereas in peripheral colonies (New 
Granada and the Rio de la Plata), it resulted from militaristic opportunism, 
stimulated by smuggling interests, at the time of the Napoleonic invasion 
of the Iberian peninsula? 
In David Landes's view, it was not the outcome of colonial initiative 
"but of the weaknesses and misfortunes of Spain and Portugal at home, in 
the context of European rivalries and wars."5 Samuel Amaral, writing on 
4 See, for example, Bulmer-Thomas, Economic History of Latin America, and Haber, How Latin America 
Fell Behind. 
5 David S. Landes, The Wealth and Poverty of Natiom: Why Some Are So Rich and Some So Poor (New 
York, 1998), 313. 
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Argentina, argues that independence was a consequence oflocal pressure on 
institutions that could not provide for the needs of trade and production.6 
And Stanley and Barbara Stein have written that "perhaps it would be 
more accurate to argue that many of the colonial elite hoped to maintain 
allegiance to embattled Spain while enjoying the right to trade directly with 
Europe and the United States."7 
Fewer research monographs than grand interpretations make assessments 
of independence unpersuasive. Still, while no consensus of the causes of 
independence exists, it is evident that the consequences were the fragmen-
tation of political power, the militarization of society, and the mobilization 
of resources and men for war. 8 Political turmoil did not end with indepen-
dence. Disputes over national borders and civil wars continued for decades. 
In Landes's words: "New World strongmen exploited the vacuum and seized 
the power ... anarchic negativism invited macho warlordism."9 
A widely held view among historians is that independence was followed 
by a marked decline in economic activity in which per capita income did 
not return to colonial levels until the mid-nineteenth century.1O Moreover, 
the break with Spain and Portugal did not bring with it any immediate 
changes in the existing social and economic structures.1I The land tenure 
system and factor markets, it has been argued, did not suffer drastic changes 
after independence. For example, slavery lasted until the mid-nineteenth 
century, and until the 1880s in Brazil and Cuba. The fiscal system remained 
in part: mita ended but tributo often returned. Debt peonage and forms of 
repartimiento persisted in some regions until the late nineteenth century. 
Finally, openness to trade and factor inflows was reduced. Change, never-
theless, was brought abour by independence. Among its positive effects on 
6 Samuel Amaral, "Del mercantilismo a la libertad: Las consecuencias econ6micas de la independencia 
argentina," in Leandro Prados de la Escosura and Samuel Amaral, eds., La independencia americana: 
Consecuencias economicas (Madrid, 1993), 202-3. 
7 Stanley J. Stein and Barbara H. Stein, The Colonial Heritage of Latin America. Essays on Economic 
Dependence in Perspective (New York, 1970), 13I. 
8 Tulio Halperin Donghi, "Economy and Society," in The Cambridge History of Latin America, vo!. 3. 
9 Landes, Wealth and Poverty of Nations, 313. 
IQ Coatsworth, "Notes on the Comparative Economic Histoty." In the case of the United States, con-
jectural estimates show that per capita income stagnated in the quarter centuty after independence, 
whereas it grew below 0.3 percent yearly in the opening decades of the nineteenth centuty. Cf. Peter 
C. Mancall and Thomas Weiss, "Was Economic Growth Likely in Colonial British North America?" 
Journal of Economic History 59, I (1999): 17-40. 
11 Bill Albert, South America and the World Economy from Independence to I930 (London, 1983), 25. 
Neither did they take place in the former metropolis. It can be conjectured that GDP per head in 
the 1790S was not surpassed in Spain until the 1840s. Cf. Leandro Prados de la Escosura, De imperio 
a nacion. Crecimiento y atraso economico en Espafia, I78o-I930 (Madrid, 1988), chap. I. 
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growth, historians emphasize the end of the external trade monopoly and 
the possibility of raising capital in international markets, whereas the end 
of the de facto customs union, capital flight, and the collapse of the colonial 
fiscal system are stressed among its negative effects. I2 
The costs and benefits of independence have been assessed by 
Coatsworth, who concluded that in the short run the direct and indirect 
economic benefits of independence were small, as were the measurable costs 
of colonialism: the limited net benefits of independence were overcome by 
new costs, such as prolonged wars, civil strife, and economic instability. 
In the long run, however, there were economic benefits from the destruc-
tion of the colonial institutional order: independence led to institutional 
modernization. '3 
Should the costs of colonialism include not only what was extracted 
but what was not produced due to wrong incentives created by colonial 
institutions and path dependency? And why did the elimination of tax and 
tariff restrictions fail to promote self-sustained growth? These are recurrent, 
yet unanswered, questions among historians of Latin America. 
To provide an answer to all these crucial questions is well beyond the 
scope of this chapter and its author's ability. Thus, for the remainder of the 
paper, I will assess grand interpretations or meta-narratives, centered on the 
theme of Latin America in the U.S. mirror. Then the alternative approach 
of evaluating postindependence Latin American performance in the Mrican 
and Asian mirrors will be proposed. Finally, I will examine the empirical 
evidence on the main consequences of independence, resulting from the 
removal of the colonial burden and the opening up to the international 
economy. Some concluding reflections complete the chapter. 
GRAND INTERPRETATIONS: LATIN AMERICA 
IN THE U.S. MIRROR 
In the three decades after World War 11, the Dependency School provided 
the dominant grand theory about Latin America's underdevelopment. Stan-
ley and Barbara Stein, in their widely read book The Colonial Heritage 
of Latin America, developed an interpretive framework for understanding 
12 Bulmer-Thomas, Economic History of Latin America, 28-3I. 
13 John H. Coatsworth, "La independencia latinoamericana: Hip6tesis sobre los costes y beneficios," 
in La independencia americana: Comecuencias economicas, '9. 
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Latin American independence. Why did British America and Latin America 
develop so differently after independence? Why did Latin America remain 
a primary producer while the United States industrialized? According to 
the Steins, the core of Iberian colonialism in Latin America was "the orga-
nization and maintenance of economies profitable to overseas metropolises 
and ... through them to the key economies of western Europe: Holland, 
England, and France."14 The colonial economic background (with the large 
estate as its key feature) was reinforced by local conditions (lack of politi-
cal unity, conflict of economic interests, highly concentrated income, and 
poverty) and, in particular, by the economic pressure of Great Britain. "The 
English," they conclude, "had been the major factor in the destruction of 
Iberian imperialism; on its ruins they erected the informal imperialism of 
free trade and investment."15 The Steins' main contention was that the fail-
ure to achieve sustained and balanced growth over the nineteenth century 
was a result of the persistence of the colonial heritage in the new republics. 
Perhaps it was Christopher Platt who most firmly opposed the Steins' 
views. In Platt's assessment, independence had a very limited impact, and 
only after 1860 did a lagged effect become apparent. Independence brought 
a redirection of trade from Iberia to northern Europe and the United 
States, but the volume of Latin American trade did not change significantly. 
Independence did not make Latin America into a major primary product 
exporter or into a large market for foreign industrial goods. In addition, 
modern economic growth was constrained by lack of human and physical 
capital, shortage of industrial fuels, poor infrastructure, and small markets. 
The break with Spain, Platt argued, "far from confirming the integration 
of Latin America as a dependent partner in the world economy, reintro-
duced an unwelcome half century of'independence' from foreign trade and 
finance," leading to the conclusion that nineteenth-century Latin America 
was "shaped by domestic circumstances rather than by the planned require-
ments of distant metropolis."16 Platt's views could be perhaps rephrased 
by saying that Latin America became prematurely independent before the 
onset of the first wave of globalization with its powerful stimulus for growth. 
The halcyon days of the Dependency School are long past. Empirical 
research within national boundaries is the way historians deal nowadays 
14 Stanley J. Stein and Barbara H. Stein, "D. C. M. Platt: The Anatomy of 'Autonomy,'" LatinAmerican 
Research Review 15 (1980): 134. 
15 Stein and Stein, Colonial Heritage, 155. 
16 D. C. M. Platt, "Dependency in Nineteenth-Century Latin America: An Historian Objects," Latin 
American Research Review 15 (1980): 130. 
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with the question of what the economic consequences of independence 
were. The development of the new institutional economic history in Latin 
America has renewed, though, the grand interpretations tradition and led 
to an explicit comparison with the U.S. historical experience, stressing the 
striking differences between British North American and Iberian Ameri-
can colonies. They provide, according to Douglass North, "the best com-
parative case ... of the consequences of divergent institutional paths for 
political and economic performance."'7 Their radically different evolu-
tion reflected the imposition of distinct metropolitan institutions on each 
colony. ,8 North's main proposition is that different initial conditions, in 
particular the religious and political diversity in the English colonies as 
opposed to the religious uniformity and bureaucratic administration of the 
existing agricultural society in the Spanish colonies (Mexico and Alto Peru, 
in particular) are responsible for differences in performance over time. 
North's interpretation has been opposed by scholars who do not accept 
the claim that institutions are exogenous. '9 For example, for Spanish Amer-
ica, Engerman and Sokoloff posit that the initial inequality of wealth, 
human capital, and political power conditioned institutional design and, 
thus, performance. Large-scale estates, built on preconquest social organi-
zation and extensive supplies of native !ab or, established the initial levels of 
inequality. Elites (by 1800 less than 20% of the population was white) man-
aged to design institutions protecting their privileges. Government policies 
and institutions reproduced initial conditions leading to the restriction of 
competition and selective policies in offering opportunities.20 For exam-
ple, in Mexico and Peru, a large native population, coupled with Spain's 
acceptance of preexisting native practices of awarding claims on labor and 
natutal resources to the elite, fostered highly concentrated landholdings 
and, consequently, social and economic inequality.2I All this was in sharp 
contrast with the white population's demographic predominance, more 
17 Douglass C. North, "Institutions and Economic Growth: An Historical Introduction," World Devel-
opmentI7, 9 ('989): '330 . 
18 Douglass C. North, Imtitutiom, Imtitutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge, 1990), 
102. 
19 For a recent assessment, see Dani Rodrik, Arvind Subramanian, and Francesco Trebbi, "Institutions 
Rule: The Primacy of Institutions over Integration and Geography in &onomic Development" 
(IMF Working Paper 021r89, November 2002). 
20 Kenneth Sokoloff and Stanley L. Engerman, "Institutions, Factor Endowments, and Paths of De vel-
opment in the New World," Journal o/Economic Perspectives 14,3 (2000): 217-32. 
21 Stanley L. Engerman, Stephen H. Haber, and Kenneth L. Sokoloff, "Inequality, Institutions, and 
Differential Paths of Growth among New World Economies," in Claude Menard, ed. Institutiom, 
Contracts, and Organizatiom (Cheltenham, 2000), 108-34. 
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evenly distributed wealth, and high endowment of human capital per head 
in British North America.22 
Institutional historians have reacted to these factor endowment and 
wealth distribution arguments by emphasizing the relative independence 
of institutions, policies, and events from any given distribution of wealth 
and income. Although acknowledging that the legal system represented 
an obstacle to growth because the caste system constrained factor mobil-
ity, John Coatsworth and Gabriel Tortella deny the links between Iberian 
institutions transferred to America and the initial unequal distribution of 
income and wealth, stressing that "the caste system of the New World 
deliberately weakened the grip of local conquerors and magnates on the 
underlying indigenous population and placed sharp limits on the growth of 
inequality in the distribution of wealth by recognizing indigenous property 
rights and guaranteeing the majority of the indigenous population access 
to land independent of the colonial elite."23 
North, Summerhill, and Weingast concede, in turn, that factor endow-
ments were the driving force of European colonization, but are not suffi-
cient to explain postindependence behavior, as the discrepancies between 
the U.S. path to world leadership and Spanish America's violence and 
retardation confirm. If factor endowments determined political outcomes, 
they argue, ''Argentina would be as rich as the United States."24 North 
and his associates stress the sharp institutional contrast between the inde-
pendent United States (with a constitution and a stable and well-specified 
system of economic and political rights) and Latin America (under polit-
ical instability and warfare). In their view, the absence of institutional 
arrangements capable of establishing cooperation between rival groups led 
to destructive conflict that diverted capital and labor from production and 
consigned the new republics to poor performance relative to the United 
States. 
22 It should be noted that inequality in Latin America was probably comparable to that in the slave 
states of North America, where per capita income was, however, surely much higher. 
23 John H. Coatsworth and Gabriel Tortella, "Institutions and Long-Run Economic Performance in 
Mexico and Spain, 1800--2000" (Working Papers on Latin America, no. 02103.1, David Rockefeller 
Center for Latin American Studies, Harvard University, 2002). 
24 Douglass C. North, William R. Summerhill, and Barty R. Weingast, "Order, Disorder, and Economic 
Change: Latin America versus North America," in Btuce Bueno de Mesquita and Hilton L. Root, 
eds., Governingfor Prosperity (New Haven, CT, 2000), 19. It should be borne in mind, however, 
that by 1913 Argentina was the sixth countty in the world in terms of per capita income, and in 
comparison to Europe second only to Great Britain. See Leandro Prados de la Escosura, "International 
Comparisons of Real Product, 1820--1990: An Alternative Data Set," Explorations in Economic History 
37,1 (2000): 1-40. 
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So far, all the views surveyed take the United States as the yardstick with 
which to measure Latin American achievements in the nineteenth cen-
tury. Is such an approach the appropriate strategy to disentangle the causes 
of Latin America's poor economic performance? In fact, overemphasizing 
the contrast with North America leads to a negative assessment of Latin 
America's economic and political behavior both before and after indepen-
dence. The income gap between colonial British and Latin America kept 
widening in the half century after independence. According to Maddison, 
the United States doubled Latin American product per head by 1820 and 
more than trebled it by 1870.25 
However, stressing over and over again that a large gap existed has para-
lyzing effects on research on nineteenth-century Latin American economic 
history. Actually, it confuses the initial conditions in the new republics with 
their postindependence performance. Moreover, it diverts attention from 
the real issue: the extent to which Latin America underperformed in terms 
of its own potential. Nathaniel Leff's reflections on Brazil can be extended 
to Latin America as a whole. The fact that the new republics fell behind the 
United States or northwestern European nations does not imply that devel-
opment opportunities were necessarily missed. On the basis of predictably 
large differences in human (and physical) capital to labor ratios it can be 
hypothesized that British North America and Latin America probably had 
different steady states. 
The relevant question, then, would be, what are the feasible counter-
factual scenarios that might have led to higher rates of growth?26 These 
hypothetical alternatives should be clearly specified before jumping to the 
conclusion that Latin America failed because it followed a different and 
less successful path to the twentieth century than the United States or 
Germany. In fact, per capita income divergence between rich (core) and 
poor (periphery) countries is the dominant feature of the nineteenth cen-
tury.27 Historical research can only elucidate within the limits of feasibility, 
that is, the extent to which events followed the course they did as deter-
mined by a set of initial conditions and some internal logic over time. 
25 Angus Maddison, The World Economy. A Millennial Perspective (Paris, 2001), 264. 
26 Nathaniel H. Leff explores alternative scenarios of rising productivity in the domestic secror relative 
to the external sector, of higher investment in social overhead capital, and of immigration restrictions, 
to reject all of them as unrealistic. See "Economic Development in Brazil, 1822-1913," in How Latin 
America Fell Behind, 58-9. 
27 This line of reasoning has recently been applied to the study of the USSR's development by Robert 
Alien, Farm to Factory: A Reinterpretation of the Soviet Industrial &volution (London, 2002). fu Alien 
writes, this is so because "convergence represents the diffusion of the industrial revolution" (1-8). 
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AB Leff put it, "the study of history can spare later observers depressing 
reflections that have no basis in the realm of the possible."28 
Moreover, the current historical approach to Latin American economic 
backwardness resembles historical assessments of continental European 
backwardness a quarter of a century ago when countries' success or failure 
depended on the extent to which they were able to replicate Britain's indus-
trialization experience. AB a result, a common claim was to depict France 
as a backward country. Gerschenkron's analysis of latecomers' substitution 
for missing prerequisites and O'Brien and Keyder's pathbreaking study of 
growth in France and Britain demonstrate that differences in endowments 
(and hence relative factor prices) and past economic policies and institu-
tions led to different paths to economic development. Therefore, only the 
extent to which a country achieved its own unique growth potential should 
determine its success or failure. 29 Geography, public policies, and political 
institutions all mattered in shaping Latin American countries' long-run 
economic performance. 
LATIN AMERICA IN THE AFRICAN 
AND ASIAN MIRRORS 
Because difficulties in modeling growth potential might render the pro-
posal impractical, a promising line of research would be to compare Latin 
America with other former European colonies. It is worth noting that quite 
a few ABian, African, and Eastern European countries shared, at the time of 
their independence, some of the initial conditions of the postindependent 
Latin American republics, including similar demographic patterns, such as 
a delayed demographic transition and persistent high fertility until the late 
twentieth century; low population density (except in ABia); a high share 
of the adult population employed in agriculture; low social and human 
capital; poor contract enforcement; and a weak government yielding to 
interest groups. On top of that, a glance at levels of GDP per capita 
at the time of independence for the main African and ABian countries 
28 Leff, "Economic Development ofBrazil." in How Latin America Fell Behind, 59. A more complete dis-
cussion of counterfactual propositions and potential effects on Brazilian long-run growth is discussed 
in Nataniel H. Leff, Underdevelopment and Development in Brazil, 2 vols. (London, 1982). 
29 Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective. A Book of Essays (Cam-
bridge, 1962); Patrick O'Brien and <;:aglar Keyder, Economic Growth in Britain and France, I78o-I9I4-
Two Paths to the Twentieth Century (London, 1978). 
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(Table 13.2) shows a resemblance with those of Mexico or Brazil around 
1820, whereas all of them remained far below the u.s. level at the time of 
its independence in 1776. 
Does all this mean that the current approach that depicts the indepen-
dence of Latin America as part of the wave ofliberal revolutions that swept 
throughout Europe in the post-Napoleonic era is Eurocentric and inad-
equate, and that a more appropriate approach would be to compare the 
postcolonial experience of Latin America to the postcolonial experiences 
that took place, later in time, in other parts of the periphery, such as Asia 
and Africa?30 
Models linking economic geography and institutions that allow for 
diverse colonial patterns seem useful for the purpose of placing the expe-
rience of postindependence Latin America in a more realistic context. 
Differences in economic prosperity across countries are linked to geo-
graphic, climatic, or ecological factorsY Jeffrey Sachs, for example, con-
cludes that technology, disease environment, and transport costs are deter-
mined by physical geography and climate.32 Acemoglu, Johnson, and 
Robinson, in turn, point to the disease environment at the time of Euro-
pean arrival as a determinant of the patterns of European settlement 
and the subsequent institutional development of the former colonies. In 
densely populated areas there were diseases (malaria and yellow fever) to 
which Europeans were vulnerable, preventing them from settling in large 
numbers.33 
In another recent contribution, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson stress 
the differential impact of colonialism. Societies where colonialism led to the 
establishment of good institutions ("institutions of private property" that 
allow a broad sector of society to receive returns on their investments) pros-
pered relative to those where colonialism imposed "extractive institutions" 
(such as forced labor and tribute), under which most of the population 
30 This alternative approach has also been suggested recently by Jonathan C. Brown in his review of 
Jeremy Adelman's Republic o/Capital. Buenos Aires and the Legal Transformation o/the Atlantic World 
(Stanford, CA, (999). See Brown, Hispanic American Historical Review 81,3-4 (2001): 765-71. 
3
' 
Jared Diamond, Gum, Germs and Steel. The Fate o/Human Societies (New York, (997). 
32 Jeffrey D. Sachs, "Tropical Underdevelopment" (NBER Working Paper Series, no. 8II9, 2001). 
Also, for a typology of the approaches, see John W McArthur and Jeffrey D. Sachs, "Institutions 
and Geography: Comment on Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2000)" (NBER Working Paper 
Series, no. 8II4, 2001). 
33 Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson, "The Colonial Origins of Comparative 
Development: An Empirical Investigation," American Economic Review 91, 5 (2001): 1369-1401. Note, 
however, that a bad disease environment did not always coincide with high population density. The 
hisrorical consensus on sub-Saharan Mrica would be a case in point. 
The Economic Consequences of Independence 
Table 13.2. Per capital GDP in Latin American, Asian, 
and African countries at the time of independence 
c.J776 
U.S.A. 1,166 
c.1820 
Brazil 646 
Mexico 759 
average 703 
1950 
Mghanistan 645 
Bangladesh 540 
Cambodia 518 
India 619 
Laos 613 
Myanmar 396 
Pakistan 643 
Vietnam 658 
Indonesia 840 
average 608 
1960 
Botswana 403 
Chad 569 
Gambia 650 
Kenya 726 
Mali 535 
Rwanda 656 
Tanzania 433 
Togo 698 
Uganda 713 
Cameroon 832 
Nigeria 869 
Sierra Leone 856 
average 662 
Sources: Angus Maddison, The World Economy. A Millennial View 
(Paris, 2001); U.S. figure for 1820 extrapolated back to 1776 with 
growth rates taken from Peter C. Mancall and Thomas Weiss, 
"Was Economic Growth Likely in Colonial British North America?" 
Journal of Economic History 59, I (1999): 17-40. A lower figure of 
$912 would be obtained with Maddison's own conjectures. 
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risked expropriation at the hands of the ruling elite or the government.34 
European colonialism led, paradoxically, to the development of relatively 
better institutions in previously poor areas, whereas it introduced or rein-
forced extractive institutions in previously prosperous areas. The reason is 
that poor areas were less densely populated, enabling Europeans to settle 
in large numbers and to develop their own institutions, thus encouraging 
investment and growth. Conversely, where abundant population showed 
relative affiuence, establishing "extractive institutions" with political power 
concentrated in the hands of an elite represented the most efficient choice 
for European colonizers, despite its negative effects on long-term growth.35 
Examples of colonial "extractive institutions" can be found in Spanish 
America (principally in Mesoamerica and the Andes), French-dominated 
Southeast Asia, British India, and regions of Mrica under French or British 
dominance. In the case of Mexico and Peru, the exploitation of silver 
deposits determined that economic activity would center on the locations 
where the deposits were found, and this conditioned population settlement, 
the location of urban centers, and fiscal policies.36 
There are interesting connections between Acemoglu, Johnson, and 
Robinson's interpretation of different colonial patterns and Stanley and 
Barbara Stein's conjecture thirty years ago that "had the Englishmen found 
a dense and highly organized Amerindian population, the history of what 
is called the United States would record the development of a stratified, 
biracial, very different society. In a larger context, the existence of a huge, 
underpopulated virgin land of extraordinary resource endowments directly 
facing Europe and enjoying a climate comparable to that of Europe rep-
resented a potentiality for development which existed nowhere else in the 
New World. "37 
It can be concluded, then, that both institutional and geographical 
approaches predict significantly different outcomes for colonial and postin-
dependence British North America and Latin America, and it could be 
added that in empty lands more efficient institutional settings went hand 
34 Daron AcemogIu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson, "Reversal of Fortune: Geography and 
Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution," Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics Iq, 4 (2002): 1231-94. 
35 An exception seems to have been the American antebellum South. 
36 Cf. Roberto Cortes Conde and George T. McCandless, '~gentina: From Colony to Nation. Fiscal 
and Monetary Experiences from the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries," in Michael D. Bordo 
and Roberto Cortes-Conde, eds., Transforring Wealth and Power from the Old to the New World. 
Monetary and Fiscal Institutions in the I7th through the I9th Centuries (Cambridge, 2001), 379. 
37 Stein and Stein, Colonial Heritage of Latin America, 128. 
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in hand with better factor endowments (higher human capital/labor and 
physical capital/labor ratios). 
Evidence on exogenous geographic factors such as climate, latitude, and 
distance to the seacoast, together with levels of mortality, population den-
sity, and urbanization at the time of European colonization (see Table 13.3) 
tend to support the view that a wider range of similarities existed between 
most Latin American countries and the European colonies in Asia and 
Mrica than with British North America. 
Another way of stressing the similarities between Latin America and these 
other colonies is comparing assessments of postindependence performance 
in sub-Saharan Mrican and Latin America. There is a striking degree of 
similarity between the assessments of sub-Saharan Mrica by present-day 
development economists and the assessments of Latin America by economic 
historians, suggesting that postindependenceMrica (and, presumably, Asia) 
is a more appropriate benchmark of comparison for Latin America than 
the United States. Nonetheless, the different timing of independence in 
Latin America (prior to the first wave of globalization) and in Mrica and 
Asia (during the first stages of the second wave of globalization) surely had 
a distinctive impact on economic growth. 
Let us start with an overall assessment of sub-Saharan Mrica's inde-
pendence that would be accepted by most scholars as a good depic-
tion of the Latin American postcolonial experience: " ... in the move to 
independence ... optimism was widespread. National development plans 
envisioned rapid growth, fuelled by industrial expansion, diversifica-
tion of exports, modernization of agriculture, and public investment in 
health and education. Looking back, the legacy [was] mainly one of 
disappointment. "38 
Assessments of different aspects of postindependence Mrica and Latin 
America are illuminating: 
THE SHOCK OF POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE 
[In Latin America, there was al complete lack of experience in autonomous decision 
making and government: state-building required creating institutions from scratch 
in an environment of change and uncertainty. In its absence, warfare was the 
norm.39 
38 Benno N. Ndulu and Stephen A. O'Connell, "Governance and Growth in Sub-Saharan Mrica," 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 13, 3 (1999): 42, 
39 North, Summerhill, and Weingast, "Order, Disorder and Economic Change," 45. 
Table 13.3. Comparative geography and historical demography of Latin America 
Europeans' adult 
Mean annual % Land area within Absolute value of mortality rates in Urbanization Population 
temperature QC 100 km of sea coast latitude early 19th century rate in 1500 density in 1500 
Argentina 17.1 0.123 0.378 68·9 0.0 0.11 
Bolivia 21.5 0.000 0.189 71.0 10.6 0.83 
+ Brazil 23·7 0.093 0.111 71.0 0.0 0.12 '-J 
0\ Chile 0.662 68·9 0.0 0.80 13·4 0·333 
Colombia 22·5 0.160 0.044 71.0 7·9 0.96 
Costa Rica 25-1 1.000 0.111 78.1 9.2 1.54 
pominican Republic 25. 6 1.000 0.211 130.0 3.0 I.46 
Ecuador 19.1 0.368 0.222 71.0 10.6 2·17 
El Salvador 23. 6 1.000 0.150 78.1 9.2 1.54 
Guatemala 21.7 0.425 0.170 71.0 9.2 1.54 
Honduras 25-4 0.669 0.167 78.1 9.2 1.54 
Mexico 19·0 0·373 0.256 71.0 14.8 2.62 
Nicaragua 26.6 0.633 0.144 163.3 9.2 1.54 
Panama 27·5 1.000 0.100 163.3 9.2 1.54 
Paraguay 23.0 0.000 0.256 78.1 0.0 0.50 
Peru 20·5 0.173 0.111 71.0 10·5 1.56 
Uruguay 18·4 0.312 0.367 71.0 0.0 0.00 
~ 
'-l 
'-l 
Venezuela 24.8 0.244 0.089 78.1 0.0 0·44 
Central America & 25. I 0.8I8 0.I50 I08.8 8·3 I.53 
Caribbean 
South America 20·5 0.I96 0. 209 72.I 3.2 0·59 
Southern Cone I6.3 0.366 0·359 69. 6 0.0 0·30 
Latin America 22.1 0·457 0.189 86·3 6·3 1.16 
Non-Spanish 26.6 1.000 0.206 130.0 3·0 2·97 
West Indies 
Asia 26.1 0·554 0.160 74. 2 6,9 10.17 
Northern Africa 20.0 0.283 0.336 71.8 14-7 32.06 
Sub-Saharan Africa 25. 6 0.170 0.1l2 567.5 
United States 1l.2 0.1l2 0.422 15.0 0.0 0.09 
Canada -0.2 0.021 0.667 16.1 0.0 0.02 
Australia & 16·9 0·579 0.378 8.6 I.5 0.20 
New Zealand 
Sources: John W McArthur and Jeffrey D. Sachs, "Institutions and Geography: Comment on Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2000)" (NBER 
Working Paper Series 8114, 2001); Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson, "Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions 
in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution" (NBER Working Papers Series 8460, 2001). 
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In most [Mrican] countries, neither the state, operating at national scale, nor 
private domestic capital ... existed in a meaningful sense at the time of indepen-
dence.40 
THE NUMBER AND SIZE OF COUNTRIES AFTER INDEPENDENCE 
[The new Latin American republics did] lack self-enforcing institutions that con-
strained predatory action. In the face of widespread violence, political organization 
disintegrated into smaller units (around a caudillo for protection).4' 
Because of its colonial heritage, Mrica has smaller countries in terms of 
population than other regions. Many states combined low population with 
low levels of incomeY 
INDIRECT GOVERNANCE 
[In Latin America,] the caste system of the New World deliberately weakened the 
grip of local conquerors and magnates on the underlying indigenous population 
and ... recognized indigenous property rights ... guaranteeing the majority of the 
indigenous population access to land independent of the colonial elite.43 
[The] French administrated their [Mrican] territories federally while the British 
tradition of indirect colonial governance was less centralizing. They acted to rein-
force ethnic identities. It was the existence of national borders that gave rise to a 
political management problem (local scale of economic and political activity).44 
INHERITED INSTITUTIONS OF THE METROPOLIS 
[T]he struggle was imbued with ideological overtones that stemmed from the 
American and French revolutions. Independence [in Latin America] brought 
United States inspired constitutions, but with radically different consequences.45 
The inability to limit political power [in Latin America] led to the development 
of an authoritarian system and rent-seeking.46 
Political constitutions at the time of [Mrican] independence were modeled 
on their European counterparts: British colonies, parliamentary systems; French 
colonies, republican ones with strong executive positions. On paper, these institu-
tions built in substantial pluralism and political liberties. But they were not to last. 
By 1975, nearly all Mrican political regimes had cast off the trappings of pluralism 
and replaced it with authoritarian structures.47 
40 Ndulu and O'Connell, "Governance and Growth," 63. 
4' North, Summerhill, and Weingast, "Order, Disorder and Economic Change," 44-5. 
42 Paul Collier and Jan Willem Gunning, "Why Has Mrica Grown Slowly?" Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 13,3 (1999): 9· 
43 Coatsworth and Tortella, "Institutions." 
44 Ndulu and O'Connell, "Governance and Growth," 46-9. 
45 North, "Institutions and Economic Growth," 1329. 
46 North, Summerhill, and Weingast, "Order, Disorder and Economic Change," 48. 
47 Ndulu and O'Connell, "Governance and Growth," 47. 
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INSTITUTIONS, INFRASTRUCTURE, UNDERDEVELOPMENT 
Latin America stagnated because economic institutions distorted incentives 
and constrained development (political risk associated with unpredictable 
policies and inefficient property rights and tax and regulatory systems) and 
high transport costs prevented exploitation of natural resources.48 
Lack of social capital and subsequent high incidence of corruption, 
heavily regulated financial markets with banks lending directly to the gov-
ernment, poor infrastructure, and poor contract enforcement (with high 
marginal returns for capital and low rates of investment as its consequences) 
were obstacles to development in postcolonial Africa.49 
Some topics for comparative research on postcolonial experiences in 
Africa, Asia, and Latin America emerge from this discussion. First, the 
consensus is that the contemporary African political map was largely deter-
mined by the nineteenth-century "scramble for Africa." However, it is 
noteworthy that the same fragmentation occurred in Latin America after 
independence, suggesting that an endogenous explanation would be more 
appropriate. 
Second, why did the British and Spanish often use indirect governance 
in their African, Asian, and Latin American colonies? High indigenous 
population density, the explanation suggested by Acemoglu, Johnson, and 
Robinson, does not seem to fit the case of sub-Saharan Africa. 
Third, a move toward authoritarian regimes took place in the Latin 
American, African, and Asian ex-colonies after a democratic start immedi-
ately after independence. Was it because of the necessity for strong leader-
ship when institutions are initially weak and latent conflicts strong? 
ASSESSING THE CONSEQUENCES OF 
INDEPENDENCE: REMOVING THE COLONIAL 
BURDEN AND OPENING UP TO THE 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 
Most of the grand theories discussed earlier treat either institutions or 
factor endowments as exogenous. Moreover, they lack a time dimension 
and implicitly present a closed economic model. So, if static compari-
son between Latin America and the United States is discarded, a dynamic 
48 Coatsworth, "Economic and Institutional Trajectories," 23-4. 
49 Paul Collier and Jan Willem Gunning, "Explaining African Economic Performance," journal of 
Economic Literature 37, I (1999): 65-75. 
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framework is needed that captures the impact of the breakdown of the colo-
nial regime and the new republics' gradual incorporation into an increas-
ingly integrated international economy. Moreover, the path to indepen-
dence was quite different between regions. The way independence was 
achieved and the previous degree of commitment to colonial mercantilism 
conditioned the new republics' performance. Independence did not level 
off regional disparities. 
In the historical literature the fiscal and trade burden of the empire has 
been emphasized, particularly for the case of New Spain (Mexico). The 
fiscal burden consisted of the taxes levied on the indigenous population to 
maintain the colonial system and the Indies' remittances (that is, revenue 
surpluses from the colonial administration that were sent to Spain). John 
Coatsworth estimated the fiscal burden at 4.2 percent of Mexican GDP (to 
my knowledge, no estimate is available for other parts of Spanish empire).50 
In the 1790S, 5 million pesos, on average, were sent annually to the metropo-
lisY This represented, perhaps, more than half of all the sums sent to Spain 
from the Latin American colonies. 52 Herbert Klein claimed that by 1800 
residents in Bourbon Mexico paid 70 percent more taxes than Spaniards 
in the metropolis, whereas Carlos Marichal reduced the difference to 40 
percent. 53 In any case, "the colonists were making a striking contribution 
to imperial administration."54 
Removing colonial rule got rid of the fiscal burden and ceteris paribus 
increased Latin American GDP. However, to get an idea of the net gain for 
Latin America, we should compare it against the increase in administrative 
costs derived from the multiplication of political units after independence. 
Reallocating resources from a big, closed economy, the colonial empire, to 
small, open economies surely implied a significant cost. 
A fragmentation of the initial national divisions took place soon after 
independence. Central America separated from Mexico by 1823, but the 
50 For a figure significantly higher than that for the thirteen North American colonies on the eve of 
independence, see John H. Coatsworth, "Obstacles to Economic Gtowth in Nineteenth-Century 
Mexico," American Historical Review 83, 1 (1978): 84-5. 
51 Carlos Marichal, "Beneficios y costes fiscales del colonialismo: las remesas americanas a Espafia, 
1760-1814," Revista de Historia Economica 15, 3 (1997): 483· 
52 If "Indies remittances" are estimated, on average, at 178 million reales de ve1l6n (8.9 million pesos), 
e( Leandro Prados de la Escosura, "La perdida del imperio y sus consecuencias econ6micas," in La 
independencia americana: Comecuencias economicas, 256-9, 269-70. 
53 Herbert Kiein, "La economia de la Nueva Espafia, 1680-1809: Un anaIisis a partir de las cajas reales," 
Historia Mexicana 34, 136 (1985): 561-609; Carlos Marichal, La bancarrota del virreinato. Nueva 
Espafia y !as finanzas del imperio espafiol, I78o-I8IO (Mexico, 1999): 92. 
54 Carlos Marichal and Marcello Carmagnani, "From Colonial Fiscal Regime to Liberal Financial 
Order, 1750-1912," in Tramferring Wealth and Power, 287. 
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Central American Federation only survived until 1838 and led to the creation 
of five new countries in 1839 (El Salvador, Costa Rica, Honduras, Nicaragua, 
and Guatemala). By 1830, Gran Colombia, comprising Venezuela, Colom-
bia, Panama, and Ecuador, broke up into three countries: Venezuela, New 
Granada (present-day Colombia and Panama), and Ecuador. The Peru-
Bolivia union (new republics in 1824 and 1825, respectively) was created in 
1836 and collapsed in 1839. Mexico had lost half its territory to the United 
States by 1848. The Viceroyalty of the Rio de la Plata became four separate 
countries: Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia, and Argentina. And in Argentina 
the search for a political solution to conflicts between Buenos Aires and the 
provinces had to wait until 1861. 
Despite its inefficiency, colonial administration took advantage of the 
increasing returns and the economies of scale that all large organizations 
enjoy. Separation brought with it clearly negative effects in terms of eco-
nomic efficiency. Commercial links among regions, however weak in colo-
nial times, were no longer guaranteed, costs in defense and law enforcement 
had to be duplicated, and coordination in the provision of public goods 
became more difficult. 55 
Independence implied the demise of the largest monetary union and 
ancien regime fiscal structure in existence. 56 A single fiscal system within a 
monetary and customs union represented a significant savings compared 
to multiple national fiscal and monetary units. Monetary disintegration 
contributed to political fragmentation, reflected in weak national admin-
istrations and increasing transaction costs. 
For each new republic the challenge was to create a new fiscal and mone-
tary system and a domestic financial market. Attempts were made at super-
imposing the United States' federalist tax model upon colonial Spanish 
administrations but the outcome was a rigid and inefficient system. Cus-
toms duties became the backbone of the new fiscal systems, as had been the 
case in the postindependence United States. The result was that most Latin 
American governments suffered chronic deficits over the first half of the 
nineteenth century as tax revenues stagnated and military expenses rose. 
On top of this, there was an increasing subordination of fiscal policies to 
military and political caudillos at the cost of weakening tax systems. 
The fragmentation of monetary regimes and chronic public deficits 
constituted an obstacle to the emergence of modern financial markets 
55 See the theoretical discussion in Patrick Bolton and Gerard Roland, 'The Breakup of Nations: A 
Political Economy Analysis," Quarterly Journal o/Economics II3 (1997): 1057-90. 
56 Marichal and Carmagnani, "From Colonial Fiscal Regime to Liberal Financial Order," 296. I am 
drawing on Marichal's part of this paper over the next paragraph. 
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throughout Latin America up to 1850. A vicious cycle emerged in which 
fiscal weakness led to weak governments, which led, in turn, to frequent 
challenges to the elite in power. Civil strife proliferated. 
North, Summerhill, and Weingast provide a highly theoretical and per-
suasive, though untested, explanation for the fiscal and administrative prob-
lems faced by the newly independent republics. In the colonial era, the 
political order did not provide incentives for long-term economic growth 
but did set limits on groups that might have tried to expropriate or attack 
each other. After independence, third-party enforcement of rights vanished 
and no single group's aggression was costly enough to be avoided, with 
widespread turmoil, violence, and political instability as a result. The lack 
of stabilizing institutions in place meant that it was impossible to achieve 
efficient economic organization. Hence, a scramble to preserve colonial 
protections and privileges or to secure new powers occurredF The break 
with the metropolis, North and his collaborators argue, destroyed many of 
the institutions that provided credible commitments to rights and property 
within the Spanish empire. Creoles gaining political power after indepen-
dence inherited a centralized political system without inheriting critical ele-
ments of the formal and informal constraints protecting corporate groups 
and other elites. As a result, "state-building" failed in the new republics. 
This kind of reasoning has been objected to by Stephen Haber and 
Armando Razo, who claim that in post-191O revolutionary Mexico there 
was no necessary connection between political instability and the security 
of property rights. 58 Stable institutions can be impediments to growth when 
risk-taking is constrained and property rights are not enforced.59 
A detailed and overall assessment for the new independent republics is 
missing, but available national studies provide some tentative answers. In 
Mexico, a profound fiscal crisis took place in the 1810S during the indepen-
dence wars. Destruction of the colonial treasury system occurred due to the 
extraordinary rise in internal military expenditures, a growing tendency to 
rely heavily on forced loans, and the trend toward increasing fiscal auton-
omy oflocal treasuries. This had an impact on the monetary system and led 
57 North, Summerhill, and Weingast, "Order, Disorder and Economic Change," 54-5. 
58 Stephen Haber and Armando Razo, "Industrial Prosperity under Political Instability: An Analysis 
of Revolutionary Mexico," in Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Hilton L. Root, eds., Governing for 
Prosperity (New Haven, CT, 2000), I06-52. Spain's hisrorical experience provides additional support: 
fast growth rook place before institutional stability was achieved under the Restauraci6n (1874-1923), 
and especially during the revolutionary years (1868-74). 
59 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Hilton L. Root, "When Bad Economics is Good Politics," in Governing 
for Prosperity, 7. 
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to the disintegration oflocal credit markets. Meanwhile, the public internal 
debt grew by nearly 40 percent between 1823 and 1848, as a result of growing 
public deficits, which reached 40 percent of total government expenditure. 
This situation was totally new, as there had been no deficits under colonial 
rule. On the contrary, Marichal has shown that there were transfers of sur-
plus from Mexico to other colonies (situados).60 Independence led to the 
abolition of two major sources of income of the colonial administration: 
the Indian tribute tax (levied on all heads of households in Indian towns) 
and mining taxes (10% duty levied on all silver produced). This implied a 
nominal reduction of potential income of the state by almost 30 percent, at 
the levels current in the late colonial period. 61 Instability paralleled public 
debt growth, leading arguably to crowding out private investment.62 
In an assessment of the macroeconomic consequences of Mexican inde-
pendence, Richard and Linda Salvucci proposed to distinguish between the 
short- and long-run effects of independence. In the short run, the civil war 
of the 1810S subverted trade, destroyed property and productive assets, and 
absorbed labor, causing output to decline by 50 percent. In the long run, 
militarism and political turmoil altered both government spending and 
the composition of expenditures during the 1830s-40s, and though out-
put did not necessarily fall, growth was negatively affected through lower 
investment.63 
The case of the other main center of the Spanish empire, Peru, points 
in a similar direction. Independence took place, however, under different 
circumstances: foreign, republican armies defeated royalist elites. Alfonso 
Quiroz posits that, as in Mexico, the republican state, under a chronic 
fiscal deficit, increased taxation on mining, making its recovery difficult. 
Wartime destruction of fixed capital, fiscal mismanagement (foreign debt, 
public expenditure), and default, together with political turmoil, had a neg-
ative impact on the economy. Independence, in the end, did not deliver 
the conditions for sustained economic growth.64 Quiroz poses the coun-
terfactual proposition that had independence been delayed until 1850, Peru 
might have suffered much lower transition costs.65 
60 Marichal, La bancarrota del virreinato, 48-52. 
61 Marichal and Carmagnani, "From Colonial Fiscal Regime to Liberal Financial Order," 298. 
62 Richard J. Salvucci and Linda K. Salvucci, "Las consecuencias econ6micas de la independencia 
mexicana," in La independencia americana: Comecuencias econ6micas, 30-53. 
63 Salvucci and Salvucci, "Las consecuencias econ6micas," 45-7. 
64 A1fonso W Quiroz, "Consecuencias econ6micas y financieras del proceso de la independencia en eI 
Peru, 1800-1850," in La independencia americana: Comecuencias econ6micas, 124-46. 
65 Quiroz, "Consecuencias econ6micas y financieras," 146. 
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In another area of large indigenous population, Central America, polit-
ical instability and war affected the economy, including the destruction 
of capital, obstacles to trade and transport, and increasing uncertainty for 
investors, whereas the government extracted forced loans from merchants. 66 
The prolonged transition to private property in areas of indigenous com-
munallandholding surely introduced uncertainty that delayed investment 
in land improvement and increased transaction costs.67 
Chile and Brazil behaved differently, because these countries managed to 
create institutions that protected groups from aggression and expropriation, 
though they did not achieve these results through the promotion of political 
competition and cooperation among subnational administrative entities.68 
Colombia, in turn, was successful in improving the colonial tax regime and, 
by 1850, had a much more fair, efficient, and neutral fiscal system. Colombia 
eliminated the unfair head tax on Indians, taxes on public employees, and 
alcabalas (a tax on all sales of domestic production) and came to rely mainly 
on customs taxes on imports.69 As ]aramillo, Meisel, and Urrutia put it, 
"the absence of pre-Columbian structures of long-standing ... plus a very 
rugged topography ... resulted in an inability of the state to control the 
economy."70 
The experience in areas oflow indigenous populations such as the Rio de 
la Plata was somewhat different. Samuel Amaral shows how the economy 
Buenos Aires profited from the disappearance of a fiscal system that cre-
ated disincentives for productive activities. Stable political institutions that 
allowed contract enforcement were introducedJ1 The colonial empire pro-
vided protection (security and justice) at moderate cost to the different parts 
of the Viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata. With independence, new providers 
of protection emerged, but with lower capacity than the metropolis. After 
1810, local powers provided local protection within their limited resources, 
66 Hector Lindo-Fuentes, "Consecuencias econ6micas de la independencia en Centroamerica," in La 
independencia americana: Comecuencias economicas, 54-79. 
67 The complexity ofland institutions inherited from the colonial period should be taken into account, 
in particular haciendas, ejidos, and communal lands with ill-defined borders, and Indian commu-
nities that linked communal ownership and group identity. 
68 Marcelo de Paiva Abreu and Luiz A. Correa do Lago, "Property Rights and Fiscal Systems in Brazil. 
Colonial Heritage and the Imperial Period," in Tram/erring Wealth and Power, 327-77; North, 
Summerhill, and Weingast, "Order, Disorder and Economic Change," 40. 
69 Jaime Jaramillo Uribe, Adolfo Meisel, and Miguel Urrutia, "Continuities and Discontinuities in the 
Fiscal and Monetary Institutions of New Granada, 1783-1850," in Transferring Wealth and Power, 
414-50 . 
70 Jaramillo, Meisel, and Uribe, "Continuities and Discontinuities," 417. 
71 Amaral, "Del mercantilismo a la libertad," 204. I draw on Amaral in the following paragraph. 
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though the disappearance of the army limited the provision of protec-
tion services in remote areas. The Rosas dictatorship restricted property 
and free trade, but the lack of political freedom did not imply total sup-
pression of economic freedom. In the interior provinces the principles of 
economic freedom were not easily accepted. Only in the 1853 constitution 
did Argentina adopt a national organization based on economic freedom, 
but its implementation took another thirty years. 
As the separation of Uruguay and Paraguay underscored, the provinces 
of the Viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata failed to devise an incentive structure 
that could keep them voluntarily united under a single government and 
allow them to take advantage of economies of scale in the provision of 
defense and justice, thus reducing transaction costs and encouraging eco-
nomic development. Military threats and trade blockades had long-lasting 
economic and political consequences for Paraguay. They led, according to 
Mario Pastore, to the collapse of public finances and to economic contrac-
tion. This caused the political demise of proponents of more representative 
government and freer trade and gave rise to political absolutism and redis-
tribution of property to the state.72 Economic activity in the three decades 
following independence fell below the levels reached in the late colonial 
period. 
Buenos Aires profited more than the interior provinces from indepen-
dence, with new financial institutions, a new currency, expansion into the 
interior, and increased livestock production, whereas in the interior stag-
nation and political instability continued until 1861. 
To sum up, the qualitative evidence provided here is far from conclusive 
and its results vary from country to country. Transaction costs increased 
after independence as political and economic institutions went through a 
period of turmoil and redefinition. On the whole, it seems that only by 
the mid-nineteenth century did the gains derived from escaping the colo-
nial fiscal burden overcome the costs of increased governmental (includ-
ing military) expenses that paralleled poor definition and enforcement of 
property rights. The promising line of research initiated on Colombia by 
Jaramillo, Meisel, and Urrutia may render, if extended to other Latin Amer-
ican countries, a more optimistic assessment of the welfare consequences 
of establishing new fiscal institutions after independence. 
72 Mario H. Pastore, "Crisis de la Hacienda publica, regresi6n institucional y contracci6n econ6mica: 
Consecuencias de la independencia en Paraguay, 1810-1840," in La independencia americana: Conse-
cuencias econ6micas, 164-200. 
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Freedom from the trade burden imposed by the colonial system allowed 
the new Latin American countries to have access to expanding world com-
modity and factor markets. Coatsworth reckoned that the trade burden 
represented up to 3 percent of GDP in New Spain, again a significantly 
higher figure than the one estimated for the thirteen British North American 
colonies, but no similar guesstimate is available for other parts of the Span-
ish empire.73 Independence permitted direct trade between the new Latin 
American republics and Europe and North America and thus represented 
a reduction in transportation and commercialization costs that, ceteris 
paribus, should have increased the volumes traded. However, in the decades 
following independence, warfare and political instability made adjustment 
to the new international trade regime difficult. Bulmer-Thomas stresses 
that, over the nineteenth century, the export sector was not large enough to 
pull along domestic economies in which nontradables represented a large 
proportion of output at low levels of productivity.74 
The role of trade in Latin America's economic performance has been 
revisited by each new school of thought. Neoclassical trade theory predicts 
that trade liberalization after independence would allow Latin American 
countries to specialize along the lines of comparative advantage. In land-
abundant countries, as most of the nations in Latin America were at the 
time, specialization in primary products would be expected. Paraphrasing 
Ronald Findlay, one of the consequences of getting rid of the trade burden 
for Latin America would be to open up "a new 'frontier' where land could 
be extended .. at a rising cost in terms of other real resources."75 The 
Heckscher-Ohlin model predicts that natural resources, as the abundant 
factor, would be intensively used and, as a result, their price would increase 
relative to the price oflabor. This implies, in the Stolper-Samuelson exten-
sion of the Heckscher-Ohlin model, that in so far as land, the abundant 
factor, is more unequally distributed than labor, inequality should rise 
within national borders. 
Dependency School theorists, in turn, also saw trade as a cause of increas-
ing inequality across and within countries. The well-known works of Raul 
Prebisch stressed the role of declining terms of trade in the persistent 
73 Coatsworth, "Obstacles to Economic Growth," 84-
74 Bulmer-Thomas, Economic History of Latin America, chap. 5. 
7! Ronald Findlay, "International Trade and Facror Mobility with an Endogenous Land Frontier. Some 
General Equilibrium Implications of Christopher Colombus," in Elhanan Helpman and J. Peter 
Neary, eds., Theory, Policy and Dynamics in International Trade (Cambridge, I993), 47. 
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retardation of Latin America,76 Hans Singer, on the other hand, saw neg-
ative implications in a hypothetical improvement in the terms of trade, 
because it would lead countries to commit resources to primary production, 
with the implicit opportunity cost of not allocating them to the domes-
tic sector, where factor returns were higher as a consequence of increasing 
returns and economies of scale,77 The new economic geography provides 
another hypothesis about the role of trade in Latin American develop-
ment. Paul Krugman and Anthony Venables posit that gradually falling 
transportation costs, as was the case during the period 1820-70, period, 
would cause growing inequality: "when transport costs fall below a critical 
value, a core-periphery pattern spontaneously forms, and nations that find 
themselves in the periphery suffer a decline in real income."78 Then, they 
argue, as transport costs continue to decline, a second stage of convergence 
in real incomes eventually arrives, and peripheral countries gain against the 
core. 
To sum up, on the basis of trade theories, a series of testable hypotheses 
can be suggested for early nineteenth-century Latin America. We should 
expect an expansion of trade and, through better resource allocation, an 
increase in output (and, if underemployment of resources existed, trade 
would provide a vent for surplus). Terms of trade, according to the Prebisch 
School, might decline, but the opposite would occur according to classi-
cal economists, as Latin America exported primary goods and imported 
manufactured products,79 At the same time, changes in income distribu-
tion should take place, with a tendency for within-countries inequality to 
rise as the reward to land, the abundant and less equally distributed factor, 
improved relative to labor. Last, a worsening of the Latin American position 
in the world economy is predicted. 
Location and economies of scale are stressed by the new economic geog-
raphy. Location mattered in the nineteenth century, because the tyranny 
of distance was a determining factor in trade despite the sharp reduction 
76 Raill Prebisch, The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal Problems (New York, 
1950). 
77 Hans W Singer, "The Distribution of Gains between Investing and Borrowing Countries," American 
Economic Review. Papers and Proceedings lI, 2 (1950): 473-85. 
78 Paul Krugman and Anthony J. Venables, "Globaliution and the Inequality of Nations," Quarterly 
Journal of Economics lIO, 4 (1995): 859. 
79 Leandro Prados de la Escosura, "Terms of Trade and Backwardness: Testing the Prebisch Doctrine 
for Spain and Britain during Industrialization" (Universidad Carlos III Working Papers Series 94146, 
1994) . 
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in ocean freight and insurance rates, particularly prior to the construc-
tion of railways, which occurred on a large scale after 1870. Relative rather 
than absolute transport costs from alternative locations were what really 
mattered. Freight rates from Antwerp to Rio de Janeiro in 1850 were only 
40 percent of those prevailing in 1820, but freight rates from Antwerp to 
New York fell even more, to one-fourth. Meanwhile, insurance rates were 
cut to one-half and to one-third for trips from Rio de Janeiro and Buenos 
Aires, respectively, to Antwerp.80 Transport costs from Antwerp to Buenos 
Aires and Rio de Janeiro remained relatively stable over 1850-70 but those 
to Valparaiso, on the Pacific rim, fell by 40 percent, as a consequence of 
the convergence of transport costs to the Pacific with those to the Atlantic 
coast of Latin America's Southern Cone.8I 
Geographic constraints would imply different outcomes for interna-
tional trade across regions. Coastal regions, densely populated, and with 
temperate climates, would be at an advantage over hinterlands in tropical 
areas, especially if landlocked, because migration and infrastructure devel-
opment become more difficult and incentives exist for coastal economies to 
impose costs on them.82 Landlocked economies such as those of Bolivia and 
Paraguay, the interior regions of Mexico, Colombia, Brazil, and Argentina, 
and Andean countries such Ecuador and Peru were clearly at a disadvan-
tage against coastal regions such as those of the Southern Cone and the 
Caribbean prior to railway expansion. In addition, countries on the Pacific 
rim had a transport cost disadvantage over those on the Atlantic. Table 13.4 
provides some insights into the overall transport costs that emphasize the 
importance of internal costs of transportation. 
Thus, we should expect wide regional discrepancies in Latin Ameri-
can integration into the international economy. In Mexico, independence 
brought an increase in openness and an end to laws restricting immigra-
tion and capital inflows. Trade grew from 8.1 percent of GDP in 1800 
to 12.3 percent by 1845, according to Coatsworth. 83 Meanwhile, in Peru, 
80 Paul Scholler, "L'evolution seculaire des taux de fret et d'assurance maritimes 1819-1940," Bulletin 
de I1mtitute de Recherches Economiques et Sociales 17, 5 (1951): 523, 540. 
81 Scholler, "L' evolution seculaire des taux de fret," 543. Freights to Buenos Aires and Valparaiso became 
equal by 1868 when, by 1850, transports costs to Chile were at least one-third higher than those to 
Buenos Aires. 
82 John Luke Gallup, Jeffrey D. Sachs, and Andrew D. Mellinger, "Geography and Economic Devel-
opment," International Regional Science Review, 22, 2 (1999), 179-232. 
8) John H. Coatsworrh, 'The Decline of the Mexican Economy, 1800--1860," in Reinhard Liehr, ed., 
America Latina en la epoca de Simon Bolivar. La formacion de !as economias nacionales y los intereses 
economicos europeos, I8oo-I8S0 (Berlin, 1989), 38. 
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Table 13.4. Transport costs in Latin America, c. I842 
Average freight Internal transport cost 
from England from port to the capital 
(Sterling per ton) (shilling per 200 lb.) 
Peru 4 2 
Mexico 2·5 27·5 
Uruguay 2 0 
New Granada 2·5 90 
Bolivia 4·5 38.5 
Ecuador 4·5 30 
Chile 3·75 4·75 
Argentina 2 0 
Venezuela 8·5 
Source: Celia W Brading, "Un anilisis comparativo del costo de la vida en 
diversas capitales de Hispanoamerica (1842)," Boletin Historico de la Fundacion 
John Boulton 20 (1969): 229-66. 
mercantilist policies remained in place. After an episode of trade expansion 
up to the mid-182os, fixed prices, taxation, and protectionism remained as 
obstacles to economic activity. Only three decades later did the stimulus of 
international demand (the guano boom) open the country Up.84 Qualita-
tive evidence on Central America suggests stagnation, but current imports 
from Britain almost doubled (while import prices were practically halving) 
between two peaks (1826 and 1839), to decline afterward. 85 There were few 
incentives to trade, because physical barriers implied high transport costs. 
Independence brought with it the breakup of colonial commercial networks 
and procedures. Links between regions of the Central American Federation 
weakened as export orientation increased. Together with political instabil-
ity, this led to the creation of five new countries in 1839. An exogenous 
shock occurred as a consequence of the U.S. assimilation of California: new 
maritime routes through the Panama isthmus, together with the Panama 
railroad (1855), led to a sharp decline in transport costs, increasing trade 
and finance.86 The economy of Buenos Aires profited from the disappear-
ance of colonial regulations that forced it to trade through the metropolis. 
From reexporting silver from Alto Peru, Buenos Aires became an economy 
84 Quiroz. "Consecuencias econ6micas y financieras." 134-6. 
85 Lindo-Fuentes. "Consecuencias econ6micas de la independencia." 60. 
86 Lindo-Fuentes. "Consecuencias econ6micas de la independencia." 65-6. 
490 Leandro Prados de la Escosura 
Table 13.5. Per capita exports and per capita British investment (U.S. dollars 
at current prices) 
Per capita exports Per capita British investment 
1830 1850 1870 1825 1865 1875 
Argentina 2.0 10·3 16·5 9. 2 8·4 51.6 
Bolivia 5·5 8.6 0.0 5-4 
Bra2il 4·4 5. 0 8.6 4·9 10·9 14.1 
Chile 4·5 7.8 14.2 4·9 8.6 23·4 
Colombia 2·5 1.9 6.6 28·5 13·4 6·9 
Costa Rica 11.4 21.2 0.0 Il7·3 
Cuba 17·7 22.2 45·9 0.0 10·4 P 
Dominican J.4 5.0 0.0 18·7 
Republic 
Ecuador 2.0 4.1 8.8 8.8 
El Salvador 3.2 7·3 0.0 0.0 
Guatemala 1.7 2·5 0·4 2·4 
Honduras 4·9 3.6 0.0 99.1 
Mexico 1.8 3. 2 2·3 6.2 14·1 15.0 
Nicaragua J.7 3·5 0.6 1.8 
Paraguay 1.3 7. 2 0.0 33·7 
Peru 0·7 3·7 10.1 7·4 7.6 6502 
Uruguay 54·9 46.6 24- 0 106.1 
Venezuela 3.0 J.3 5. 2 0.0 13·5 20.2 
Total 6·4 5. 2 8·9 5.8 9·5 20·4 
Sources: Exports: Paul Bairoch and Bouda Etemad, Structure par produits des exportations 
du Tiers-Monde I83O-I937 (Genevo, 1985); for 1830: Victor Bulmer-Thomas, The Economic 
History 0/ Latin America since Independence, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, 2003); for 1850 and 1870: 
Irving Stone, "British Direct and Portfolio Investment in Latin America before 1914," Journal 
o/Economic History 37,3 (1977): 690-722• 
exporting livestock products. The main consequence of independence was 
the opening to foreign trade and the desire to add new lands for cultivation 
and livestock. 87 In contrast to Spanish America, independence in Brazil did 
not involve a shift in the direction of trade.88 
Table 13.5 provides current values of exports normalized by population. 
Though figures expressed at current prices preclude over-time comparisons, 
87 Amaral, "Del mercantilismo a la libertad," 208. 
88 Stephen H. Haber and Herbert S. Kiein, "Consecuencias economicas de la independencia brasilefia," 
in La independencia americana: Comecuencias economicas, I53-8. 
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they allow us to test the hypothesis of an uneven distribution of postinde-
pendence trade in Latin America for different points in time. fu; predicted, 
location conditioned the importance of trade, with the Southern Cone 
and the Caribbean being ahead of the rest of Latin American countries in 
terms of openness. The relative dispersion of per capita exports declined, 
however, over the entire period under consideration.89 Evidence on capital 
inflow per head from Britain, the main country investing in Latin America, 
though exhibiting a different country pattern,90 confirms the uneven inte-
gration of Latin American countries in international commodity and factor 
markets.91 
To ascertain the extent to which Latin American integration into the 
international economy took place, we would need to deflate the nominal 
values presented in Table 13.5. British investment in real terms can be 
obtained by deflating it with the price index of the United Kingdom's 
exports, because those investments were used, at least in part, to purchase 
capital goods from Britain. Again, deflating current exports by the price 
of British exports provides a measure of the purchasing power of Latin 
American exports, because the United Kingdom was the main trading 
partner of the new republics (Table 13.6). Over forty years, the purchasing 
power of both exports (1830-7°) and British investment (1825-65) per Latin 
American inhabitant increased noticeably, at an average annual rate of 
growth of 1.5 and 2.1 percent, respectively. Exports accelerated after 1850 
and their per capita rate of growth moved up from 1.2 in 1830-50 to 1.8 over 
1850-70, but British investment per head only took off after 1865, reaching 
a yearly growth rate of 9.1 percent between 1865 and 1875, a phenomenon 
linked to government loans and, to a lesser extent, associated with the shift 
of foreign investment toward railroad construction and public utilities.92 
On average, deflated British investment per head grew at 3.5 percent over 
the period 1825-75. 
National estimates of the purchasing power of exports in terms of 
imports, also known as the income terms of trade, confirm our findings. 
89 AB measured by the coefficient of variation of the relevant set of countries for each pair of adjacent 
time observations. 
90 The correlation coefficient between per capita exports and British investment is 0.38 in 1870-5. 
9' British investments amounted to more than three times French investments and more than four 
times U.S. investments in Latin America by 1913. Computed from figures in Carlos Marichal, 
ed., Las inversiones extranjeras en America Latina, I850-I930. Nuevos debates y problemas en historia 
economica comparada (Mexico, 1995), Appendix. The importance of British investment relative to 
those from other countries was even higher in earlier decades. 
92 Irving Stone, "British Direct and Portfolio Investment in Latin America before 1914," Journal of 
Economic History 37, 3 (1977): 694. 
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Table 13.6. Per capita purchasing power of total exports and British 
investment (U.S. dollars at constant prices) 
Per capita purchasing power Per capita British 
of exports investment 
1830 1850 1870 1825 1865 1875 
Argentina 2.0 15·9 21.5 9·2 12.0 84·9 
Bolivia 8·4 II.2 0.0 8·9 
Brazil 4-4 7·7 11.1 4·9 15·5 23.1 
Chile 4·5 12.1 18·4 4·9 12.2 38.6 
Colombia 2·5 2·9 8.6 28·5 19·0 11.4 
Costa Rica 17.6 27·5 0.0 193.1 
Cuba 17·7 34·3 59·6 0.0 14.8 8·4 
Dominican Republic 5·3 6·4 0.0 30 .7 
Ecuador 3.0 5·3 12·4 14·4 
El Salvador 5.0 9·4 0.0 0.0 
Guatemala 2.6 3·2 0.6 4·0 
Honduras 7·6 4·7 0.0 16p 
Mexico 1.8 4·9 3·0 6.2 20.1 24·7 
Nicaragua 5·7 4·5 0·9 2·9 
Paraguay 2.0 9·3 0.0 55-4 
Peru 0·7 5.8 13·1 7·4 10.8 107.4 
Uruguay 84.8 60·5 34·1 174·7 
Venezuela 3·0 5.0 6·7 0.0 19·1 33·2 
Total 6·4 8.1 II.6 5·8 13·5 33.6 
Notes: Current values deflated with British export price index. Exports and investment at 
1830 prices and 1825 prices, respectively. 
Sources: See Table 13.5 and Brian R. Mitchell, British Historical Statistics (Cambridge, 1988). 
Cuba's income terms of trade improved substantially (277 by 1867,1826 = 
100) because of supply increases in sugar exports.93 In Mexico, no trend was 
exhibited over 1828-51, but then a sharp improvement took place up to the 
1880s.94 In Colombia, real exports per capita doubled between the late 1830S 
and 1880, but probably did not recover the 1800 level until 1870, whereas 
income terms of trade trebled between the 1830S and the 1860s.95 In Brazil, 
93 Linda K. Salvucci and Richard J. Salvucci, "Cuba and the Latin American Terms of Trade: Old 
Theories, New Evidence," Journal of Interdisciplinary History 31,2 (2000): 197-222. 
94 RichardJ. Salvucci, "Origins and Progress ofU.S.-Mexican Trade, 1825-1884: 'Hoc opus, hic labor 
est,''' Hispanic American Historical Review 71,4 (November 1991): 697-735. 
95 Jose Antonio Ocampo, Colombia y la economia mundial, r83o-r9Io (Bogota, 1984), 89, 98. 
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real exports per capita were multiplied by three between the 1820S and the 
1850S and by four between the 1820S and the 1870s. Leff shows a substantial 
improvement in Brazilian income terms of trade at an annual trend rate of 
4.2 percent over 1822-49 (2.8% in per capita terms).96 Argentina also expe-
rienced a remarkable increase in the quantity and the purchasing power 
of its exports.97 Chilean real per capita exports, in turn, were multiplied 
by seven between independence and 1870.98 Preliminary computations for 
Latin American income terms of trade with Britain suggest that they were 
multiplied by more than five over the three decades after independence, and 
up to twelve times if the whole period 1825-75 is considered (Table 13.7). 
In the trade literature, the net barter terms of trade, that is, the ratio 
of export to import prices, which provides a measure of the purchasing 
power per unit of exports, have been depicted as a "productivity index" of 
trade. Recent research provides estimates of net barter terms of trade for 
the major Latin American countries (Table 13.8). In Mexico the net barter 
terms of trade experienced moderate improvement between 1828 and 1881 
(atI.4% per year) and probably added 3 percent to GDP by 1860.99 Brazilian 
purchasing power per unit of exports improved by three-fourths between 
1826-30 and 1876-80.100 Jose Antonio Ocampo shows that Colombia's net 
barter terms of trade improved as much as Brazil's between the late 1830S 
and 1880.101 Linda and Richard Salvucci, on the basis of Gootenberg's 
data, were able to establish that Peru's net barter terms of trade were 47 
percent higher in the early 1850S than in the 1830s.102 For Argentina, Carlos 
Newland shows an improvement that peaked in the late 1850s.103 Demand 
for exports increased due to international trade expansion and European 
industrialization. The growth of inputs used by the pastoral economy and 
productivity increases were behind the supply expansion. Newland suggests 
that the domestic terms of trade, that is, those perceived by the Argentine 
96 Leff, Underdevelopment and Development, 83. 
97 Carlos Newland, "Exports and Terms of Trade in Argentina, 18n-1870," Bulletin of Latin American 
Research 17, 3 (1998): 409-16. 
98 Jose, Diaz, Rolf Luders, and Gert Wagner, "Economia chilena 1810-1995: Evoluci6n cuantitativa 
del producto total y sectorial" (Pontificia Universidad Cat6lica de Chile, Instituto de Economia, 
Documento de Trabajo no. 186, 1998). 
99 Salvucci, "The Mexican Terms of Trade." 
100 Leff, Underdevelopment and Development, 82. 
lOr Ocampo, Colombia y la economia mundial, 93. 
102 Linda Salvucci and Richard Salvucci, "Cuba and the Latin American Terms of Trade," 216. Paul 
Gootenberg, Between Silver and Guano. Commercial Policy and the State in Postindependence Peru 
(Princeton, NJ, 1989). 
103 Newland, "Exports and Terms of Trade in Argentina," 412. 
.j:>. 
'D 
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Table 13.7. Purchasing power of Latin American exports to Britain, I79416-I87416 [I82416 = IOOj 
Latin American exports to Latin American income 
Britain (c.i.E) Current Implicit price of Imlah's price of terms of trade 
(sterling) value index U.K. exports U.K. exports M [VI] 
[I] [11] [Ill] [IV] [II/III] [IIIIV] 
1794/6 275 8.8 166·7 164.7 5-3 5-4 
180416 1270 40 .8 197.2 189.5 20·7 21.6 
181416 6227 200·3 149.6 154·9 133·9 129.3 
1824/6 3109 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1834/6 3380 108·7 71.6 77-9 151.8 139.6 
1844/6 490 5 157.8 53. 6 59·3 294·3 266.1 
185416 9698 311.9 53·5 54.8 583.1 569.1 
1864/6 22933 737.6 70 .4 1048.0 
1874/6 24133 776.2 60.8 1277.5 
Sources: Ralph Davis, The Industrial Revolution and British Overseas Trade (Leicester, 1979), col.(!), 1794/6-1854/6, col (Ill); 
Mitchell, British Historical Statistics, col. (1),1864/6-1874/6, col. (IV). 
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Table 13.8. Net barter terms of trade of Latin American countries, 
18II115-1876180 [1836140 = 100J 
Cuba Mexico Colombia Brazil Argentina 
18uII5 61 
1816120 76 
1821125 u5 
1826/30 108 84 94 127 
1831/35 100 95 107 125 
1836/40 100 100 100 100 100 
1841/45 102 98 124 97 108 
1846/50 86 101 109 104 
1851/55 69 106 120 123 
1856/60 62 100 157 U5 165 
1861/65 53 79 120 127 
1866/70 56 94 127 89 105 
1871/75 57 104 139 147 
1876/80 57 u6 178 173 
Sources: Cuba: Linda K. Salvucci and Richard J. Salvucci, "Cuba and the Latin American 
Terms of Trade: Old Theories, New Evidence," Journal of Interdisciplinary History 31, 2 
(2000): 197-222; Mexico: Richard J. Salvucci, "Origins and Progress of U.s.-Mexican 
Trade, 1825-1884: 'Hoc opus, hic labor est,''' Hispanic American Historical Review 71, 4 
(Nov. 1991): 697-735; Colombia: Jose Antonio Ocampo, Colombia y la economia mundial 
I830-I9IO (Bogota, 1984); Brazil: Nathaniel H. Leff, Underdevelopment and Development 
in Brazil (London, 1982); Carlos Newland, "Exports and Terms of Trade in Argentina, 
18u-1870," Bulletin of Latin American Research 17, 3 (1998): 409-16. 
population, should have improved more dramatically than the international 
terms of trade as independence allowed Argentina to trade directly in world 
markets, colonial tariffs were repealed, and the new 1820S tariffs were lower. 
Last, lower transport costs and the increase in the scale of trade helped 
reduce margins in international trade. Only Cuba provides an exception, 
as its net terms of trade deteriorated between 1826 and 1866 by 50 percent. 
When adjusted for productivity changes in the export sector (the so-called 
single-factorial terms of trade), no trend appears between 1826 and 1846 
and then a decline by 61 percent up to 1862.104 
Evidence tends, therefore, to reject the old view of deteriorating terms 
of trade that hindered Latin American growth precisely at the time 
104 Linda Salvucci and Richard Salvucci, "Cuba and the Latin American Terms of Trade," 204-7. 
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(1820s-70s) when large international disparities in income began to emerge. 
On the combined evidence provided by the evolution of the relative price 
of exports (Table 13.8) and the purchasing power of total exports (Tables 
13.6 and 13.7), the idea of immiserizing growth can be rejected for most of 
Spanish America and for Brazil. 105 
On the whole, it seems warranted to say that release from the colonial 
trade burden yielded net gains for the economies of Latin America, as the 
evolution of the quantities and prices of exported goods suggests. Although 
trade did not have the strength to pull up the economy as a whole, it can be 
argued that, when not hindered by geographic and institutional barriers, 
trade facilitated export-led economic growth. Trade in nineteenth-century 
Latin America, especially after 1850, seems to have been, in most national 
cases, a handmaiden of growth. 106 
The opening up to the international economy has been associated with a 
widening of income differences within and between countries. No evidence 
is available on the former for the pre-1870 period, with the exception of 
Argentina, for which CarIos Newland and Javier Ortiz have shown that 
the expansion in the pastoral sector resulting from improved terms of trade 
increased the reward of capital and land, the most intensively used factors, 
whereas the farming sector contracted and the returns of its intensive factor, 
labor, declined, as confirmed by the drop in nominal wages.107 A redistri-
bution of income in favor of owners of capital and land (estancieros) at the 
expense of workers took place. Williamson's findings for 187°-1914 also 
suggest an increase in inequality within countries in Latin America, which 
confirms empirically the Stolper-Samuelson theoretical predictions.108 
The argument follows that, because natural resources were the abundant 
105 That is, when an increase in production depresses the price of exports relative to imports so much 
that the gains in output are swamped by the loss of putchasing power for imports. For a theoretical 
discussion of the concept, see Jadish Bahgwati, "Immiserizing Growth: A Geometric Note," Review 
of Economic Studies 25, 3 (1957-8): 201-5· 
106 See Irving B. Kravis, ''Trade as a Handmaiden of Growth: Similarities between the Nineteenth and 
Twentieth Centuties," Economic Journal 80 (1970): 850-72. The export-led growth approach has 
been rejected by Leff and Catao for Brazil and Mexico. See lefT, Development and Underdevelopment, 
and Luis Catao, "The Failure of Export-Led Growth in Brazil and Mexico c. 1870-1930" (University 
of London Institute of Latin American Studies Research Papers No. 31, 1992). Bulmer-Thomas 
downplays the role of trade in promoting Latin American growth in Economic History of Latin 
America. Rafael Dobado and Gustavo Marrero, on the other hand, argue that there was export-led 
growth in colonial Mexico in "Miner/a, crecimiento y costes de la independencia en Mexico," 
Revista de Historia Economica '9, 3 (2001): 573-6II. 
107 Carlos Newland and Javier Ortiz, "The Economic Consequences of AIgentine Independence," 
Cuadernos de Economia II5 (2001): 275-90. 
108 Jeffrey G. Wllliamson, "Real Wages, Inequality, and Globalization in Latin America before 1940," 
Revista de Historia Economica '7 (1999): 101-42. 
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productive factor in Latin America, they were more intensively used in the 
production of exportable commodities. As a result, returns to land grew 
relative to returns to labor. Because the ownership of natural resources is 
more concentrated than that of labor, income distribution tended to be 
skewed toward landowners and inequality rose over the decades prior to 
World War I. 
DID LATIN AMERICA FALL BEHIND? 
Is the widespread perception of Latin America falling behind supported 
by the available evidence? And, more closely related to the topic of this 
chapter, can Latin American economic backwardness be related to the way 
in which independence occurred? 
Evidence on aggregate economic performance across countries shows a 
wide variance. In the main centers of the former Spanish empire, Mexico 
and Peru, wartime destruction of fixed capital, capital flight, silver drain 
through trade deficits, and a mining depression, together with fiscal mis-
management and political turmoil, all contributed negatively to growth. 
Public debt, it has been suggested, crowded out investment. 
A widely accepted perception is that the Mexican economic decline had 
already started before independence and lasted until the 1870s. According 
to Coatsworth's estimates, output fell by 2 percent and per capita income 
by 21 percent (-0.5% yearly) between 1800 and 1845 (and by -0.57% 
over 1800-60).I09 Maddison estimates are close to Coatsworth's figures 
for Mexico's real GDP per head.lIo Richard and Linda Salvucci suggested, 
alternatively, that, in real terms, output grew by 30 percent over 1800--40 
while population rose by 9 percent, implying that output per head increased 
by 21 percent or 0.5 percent annually.II1 This revisionist picture has been 
rejected by Richard Salvucci, who now claims that prolonged stagnation 
or decline of per capita income is a better depiction of Mexican economic 
performance over 1800--40.Il2 
109 Coatswonh, "The Decline of Mexican Economy," 31,41. This view is shared by Enrique Cardenas, 
"A Macroeconomic Interpretation of Nineteenth-Century Mexico," in How Latin America Fell 
Behind, 65-92. 
lIO Maddison, Monitoring the World Economy I82o--I992 (Paris, 1995), 143. 
III Richard and Linda Salvucci, "Las consecuencias econ6micas de la independencia mexicana," 41. 
112 Richard J. Salvucci, "Mexican National Income in the Era ofIndependence, 1800-1840," in How 
Latin America Fell Behind, 234-5. 
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The causes of the long depression of the Mexican economy are the 
subject of an intense historical debate.1I3 Among the reasons adduced for 
sluggish growth, the main one is the decline in silver production, which 
did not recover until the 1860s. The fall in silver output led to a drop in 
employment and expenditure and to a contraction of the money supply. 
Abandonment and flooding of mines and the high price of mercury, used to 
refine silver, lie behind the collapse of mining. Rafael Dobado and Gustavo 
Marrero have argued that the slow recovery of silver output, a consequence 
both of the economic policies followed in postindependence Mexico and 
of the changes in the international market for mercury, severely hindered 
Mexican economic growth. 1I4 According to Dobado and Marrero, Spain, 
a major world supplier of mercury, no longer supplied the Mexican mines 
at prices below those prevailing internationally. Mexico had to purchase 
mercury in the international market, where prices kept rising during the 
early nineteenth century. 
In Peru, as in Mexico, the republican state, laboring under chronic fiscal 
deficits, increased taxation on mining. Silver mining declined until the 
1840s. High mercury prices and interest rates, obsolete technology, and 
taxes all contributed to impede recovery.1I5 In short, independence at the 
core of the colonial empire did not deliver the conditions for sustained 
economic growth. 
Slave economies offer a distinct pattern, because they did not undergo 
a deep political and institutional transformation. Cuba remained loyal to 
Spain and experienced sustained progress until the 1860s.1I6 Brazil's econ-
omy was characterized by low rates of growth, free trade, and limited struc-
tural change, although remaining politically stable. According to Leff, per 
capita income rose at a moderate pace during the nineteenth century. 1I7 
Economies in the Southern Cone showed, in turn, sustained economic 
progress after independence. Chilean GDP per head grew at 0.9 percent 
over 1810-60, while population grew at 1.6 percent annually, with most 
of the improvement in per capita income taking place after 1830. 1I8 In 
Argentina, all economic indicators suggest fast growth led by the Buenos 
III Cardenas, "A Macroeconomic Interpretation of Nineteenth-Century Mexico," and Coatsworth, 
"The Decline of the Mexican Economy." More recently, Dobado and Marrero, "Minerla, crec-
imiento y costes de la independencia en Mexico. " 
Il4 Dobado and Marrero, "Mineria, crecimiento y costes de la independencia en Mexico," 598-607. 
Il5 Quiroz, "Consecuencias econ6micas y financieras," 129-33, 143. 
Il6 Pedro Fraile, Richard J. Salvucci, and Linda K. Salvucci, "El caso cubano: Exportaciones e inde-
pendencia," in La independencia americana: Consecuencias economicas, 80-101. 
Il7 LefT, Underdevelopment and Development, 1:33. 
Il8 Diaz, Liiders, and Wagner, "Economia chilena 1810-1995." 
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Aires region. Increases in population and labor force, urbanization, and 
a significant rise in total factor productivity in livestock production are 
among the distinctive features of postindependence Rio de la Plata.II9 
How do Latin American countries compare to other countries? Did Latin 
America, as stressed in the literature, fall behind before 1870? 
Maddison's international set of real GDP per head estimates provides the 
opportunity to place Latin America in a wider comparative framework I2O 
A first glance at the evolution of per capita income levels throughout the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Table 13.9) suggests that, relative to 
the United States, three distinctive phases appear: a first one of decline up 
to 1870 for the three countries for which estimates are available (Brazil, 
Chile, and Mexico), followed by relative stability from 1870 to 1950 for 
the six main Latin American countries for which information exists, and 
then a decline until the present, which would only begin in 1973 if Latin 
America as a whole is considered.I2I Thus, in the binary comparison with the 
United States, only the pre-1870 and the post-1950 periods can be deemed 
responsible for today's Latin American underdevelopment. 
If a country-by-country analysis is preferred for the nineteenth century, 
then the scant estimates available suggests that Mexico and Brazil fell behind 
the United States over 1820-70, but that this was not the case for Chile 
(Table 13.9).122 Between 1870 and 1913, Latin American national experiences 
varied widely, with Mexico and the Southern Cone economies catching up, 
whereas the economies of Brazil and Cuba were falling behind.123 
119 Carlos Newland, "Economic Development and Population Change: Argentina, 1810-1870," in 
John H. Coatsworth and Alan M. Taylor, eds., Latin America and the World Economy since 1800 
(Cambridge, MA, 1998), 207-22; Newland, "Exports and Terms of Trade"; Carlos Newland and 
Barry Poulson, "Purely Animal: Pastoral Production and Early Argentine Economic Growth 1825-
1865," Exploratiom in Economic History 35,3 (1998): 325-45· 
120 Alternative and more comprehensive estimates are provided for Latin Anrerica by Pablo Asrorga 
and Valpy Fit2gerald, in Rosemary Thorp, Progress, Poverty and Exclusion. An Economic History of 
Latin America in the 20th Century (Washington, DC, 1998), Statistical Appendix. However, they 
do not include other parts of the world. Maddison's estimates have a wider country coverage and 
have been preferred here in spite of their conjectural nature for many developing countries in the 
past and the index number problem derived from using a fixed 1990 benchmark for space and time 
comparisons. Cf. Prados de la Escosura, "International Comparisons." 
121 A comparison between Latin America's position relative to the United States in Maddison's estimates 
(Table 13.9) and Asrorga and Fit2gerald (Table Ip) show discrepancies; in the latter the decline 
occurred after 1980 and the relative positions were similar in 1950 and 1995. Such discrepancies 
derive not only from the country coverage of each estimate but from the use of different single 
benchmarks - 1970 in the case of Asrorga and Fit2gerald and 1990 in the case of Maddison. 
122 Estimates are based on guesses sum as Angus Maddison's estimates for Brazil in Monitoring the 
World Economy, 143, or are obtained indirectly from export and fiscal data as in the case of Chile, 
in Diaz, Ltiders, and Wagner, "Economia chilena 1810-1995." 
123 Fraile, Salvucci, and Salvucci, "El caso cubano," 83, 91, 101. The authors suggest that Cuban GDP 
per head stagnated in the late nineteenth century after experiencing growtlr over 1800-50. 
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Table 13.9. Relative levels ofGDP per head, I82o-I998 [U.S. = IOOj 
(I990 international Geary-Khamis dollars) 
1820 1870 1913 1950 1973 1998 
Argentina 43·4 72.7 52.2 47. 8 33·7 
Brazil 51.4 29.2 15-3 17·5 23·3 20.0 
Chile 48.3 53.0 55.6 38.6 29·9 35·7 
Colombia 23·3 22·5 21.0 19·5 
Cuba 68·9 35·5 19·4 7·9 
Ecuador 18.1 19.8 19·3 15.2 
Mexico 60·4 27. 6 32·7 24·7 29·0 24·3 
Peru 19.6 23·7 23·7 13·4 
Uruguay 82.0 62·4 48.7 29.8 30·4 
Venezuela 23·3 20.8 78.0 63·7 32.8 
Latin America (6) 53·4* 43.1 43. 2 43·3 37.2 29·5 
Latin America (IO) 38.9 36.1 30 .7 23·3 
Latin America 26·7 27.1 21.2 
Africa 33·3 18.2 n.o 8·9 8.2 5.0 
Northern Africa 14·5 12.2 IO·9 IO·7 
Asia 46 .1 22.6 12.8 7·5 IO·3 13.0 
Asia (excl Japan) 45-7 22.2 12.1 6.6 7·4 IO·7 
China 47·7 21.7 IO·4 4. 6 5.0 11.4 
India 42.4 21.8 12·7 6·5 5-I 6·4 
Rest of Asia 44·9 24·7 15.0 9·7 12·4 13·7 
Eastern Europe 50 .6 35. 6 28.8 22.2 29·9 20.0 
Former USSR 54.8 38.6 28.1 29.6 36.3 14.2 
Western Europe 98.0 80·7 65·5 48.0 69.1 65. 6 
United States IOO.O IOO.O IOO.O IOO.O IOO.O IOO.O 
Per capita GDP level (I990 $) 
United States 1257 2445 530I 9561 16689 27331 
* Only Brazil, Chile, and Mexico are included in 1820. 
Sources: Angus Maddison, The World Economy, A Millennial View (Paris, 200I) except for 
Cuba and Ecuador for 1913, derived from Astorga and Fitzgerald, "Statistical Appendix"; 
Chile, 1820---1990, from Jose Diaz, Rolf Liiders, and Gert Wagner, "Economia chilena, 
1810---1995: Evoluci6n cuantitativa del producto total y sectorial" (Pontificia Universidad 
Cat6lica, Instituto de Economia, Documento de Trabajo no. 186, 1998); and Argentina 
prior to 1950, from Roberto Cortes Conde, La economia argentina en ellargo plazo (Buenos 
Aires, 1997), which have been spliced to Maddison's levels. 
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The assessment of Latin American performance has been carried out, so 
far, using the United States as the relevant benchmark. The fact that, over 
the nineteenth century, most countries, including those of Western Europe, 
fell behind when measured by U.S. standards renders the U.S. yardstick 
questionable. When, instead, Latin America's performance is compared 
to that of other regions of the world, the picture changes dramatically. 124 
First, over 1820-7°, the decline relative to the United States for the three 
countries for which some reliable information exists (Brazil, Chile, and 
Mexico) is deeper than in Western Europe but similar to southern and 
Eastern Europe and the Russian empire and much milder than in Mrica 
and Asia. So, even though Latin America's position worsened in relation to 
the United States and Western Europe it remained unaltered in comparison 
to Eastern Europe and improved in comparison to the rest of today's Third 
World. Second, during the phase of the first era of globalization, 1870-1913, 
Latin America was the single major world region that did not worsen its 
position relative to the United States, hence improving vis-i-vis the rest of 
the world. Third, in the early twentieth century Latin America was (along 
with the Soviet Union) the only world region that did not yield to the 
U.S. economic advance. Fourth, the half century since 1950 inverted the 
picture. In losing ground to the United States over the golden age (1950-73) 
Latin America was joined by only India and Mrica, as most regions in the 
world experienced a process of catching up to the United States. Finally, 
the post-1973 era, allowing for substantial income differentials, placed Latin 
America alongside Eastern Europe, the USSR (and its former members), 
and sub-Saharan Mrica, all of which worsened their position relative to the 
United States as the Asian countries improved. 
To sum up, over the nineteenth century Latin America's performance was 
better than that of other regions of today's Third World and the European 
periphery. Conversely, the fact that Latin America's position relative to the 
United States remained mostly unaltered between 1950 and 1973 is at odds 
with the catching up experienced in large areas of the periphery (south-
ern and Eastern Europe, Southeast Asia), where the gap with the United 
States in terms of income per head was significantly reduced. Latin America 
again underperformed relative to Asia after 1973. In other words, blaming 
Latin America's retardation on falling behind the United States over the 
124 Because Table 13.9 is constructed using the United States as 100 for each benchmark year, the 
comparison between Latin America and other world regions is made relative to the United States, 
but the use of Geary-Khamis dollars implies that a multilateral comparison is carried out regardless 
of the country used as reference. 
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nineteenth century is a shortsighted conclusion that tends to transpose the 
widely accepted view of today's Latin America as underachieving to the 
distant past. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Disorder after independence increased transaction costs as political and 
economic institutions were redefined through a lengthy and painful process. 
Though qualitative evidence varies from country to country, for Latin 
America as a whole in the first half of the nineteenth century it is far 
from clear that the gains from eliminating the fiscal burden offset the 
tax increases needed to cover the expanding governmental expenses that 
accompanied independence. The collapse of the Spanish empire showed 
that its institutions, though inefficient, had helped by reducing transaction 
costs. 
Release from the colonial trade burden produced, in turn, net gains for 
the economies of Latin America, as the favorable evolution of quantities 
and the relative prices of goods exported suggests. Trade did not have the 
strength to pull the rest of the economy, as in the export-led growth model, 
but whenever geographic and institutional barriers did not impede it, trade 
represented a handmaiden of growth. 
The opening up to the international economy was associated with a 
deepening of income differences within and across countries. No evidence 
is available on within-countries income distribution for the pre-I870 period, 
with the exception of Argentina, where the expansion of the pastoral sec-
tor resulting from improved terms of trade increased rewards to the inten-
sively used factors (capital and land), whereas the farming sector contracted 
and the returns of its intensive factor (labor) declined. A redistribution of 
income in favor of owners of capital and land took place. Williamson's 
findings for the four decades prior to World War I confirm the increase of 
inequality within Latin American countries. 
The growth of real income per capita in Latin America was nearly I 
percent per year between independence and the eve of World War 1.125 In 
comparative terms, Latin America's performance was often better than in 
other parts of today's Third World and the European periphery. In the half 
125 Computed from Table 13.9 for the unweighted average of me three countries, Brazil, Chile, and 
Mexico, for which estimates of real income per head are available. 
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century following independence (1820-7°), real product per head grew less, 
probably not far below 0.5 percent per year, but the region's decline relative 
to the United States was similar to that of southern and Eastern Europe 
and the Russian empire, and much milder than in the cases of Africa and 
Asia. Later, in the first episode of globalization (1870-1913), Latin American 
GDP per head grew above 1.5 percent yearly and Latin America was the 
only world region that did not worsen its position relative to the United 
States and did improve noticeably with respect to the rest of the world.126 
The inheritance of Spanish ancien regime institutions in Latin Amer-
ica as opposed to nonabsolutist (post-1688) institutions in British America 
does not seem to be a solid argument explaining different performances 
any longer, especially if the scope is widened to include the postindepen-
dence performance of the British and French ex-colonies in Africa and Asia. 
British North America appears as an exceptional example of success that 
cannot be used as a yardstick against which to measure Latin America's 
performance. No definitive answer has been provided here, but it seems 
clear that before jumping to the usually negative conclusion about Latin 
America's performance in the nineteenth century, a more rigorous exami-
nation is required to establish whether Latin America managed to exploit 
real growth potential after independence. 
A series of questions that deserve further research emerge from this dis-
cussion. Had Latin America become independent later, at the time of 
the first wave of globalization, would economic growth have been more 
intense and widespread? A positive answer to this counterfactual would rein-
force Christopher Platt's assertion that "domestic circumstances" shaped 
nineteenth-century Latin America. 
Did independence cause deglobalization in the half century between 
1820 and 1870? In another chapter, Luis Bertola and Jeffrey Williamson 
argue that the fiscal needs of the new republics, exacerbated by fighting 
wars, led to raising tariffs and, consequently, to isolating Latin American 
from world markets. I27 A more important effect of the way independence 
occurred was the destruction of the colonial customs and monetary union, 
which represented a serious blow to the economic integration of Latin 
America. Would an economically united Latin America have been more 
integrated into the world economy? How much higher, if any, would per 
capita GDP have been under a United States of Latin America? 
126 Computed from Table 13.9 for the unweighted average of the six Latin American countries for 
which estimates of real income per head are available. 
127 Jeffrey G. Williamson, "Real Wages, Inequality, and Globalization." 
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A systematic comparison to other postcolonial development experi-
ences elsewhere may help in assessing Latin America's achievements and 
shortcomings after independence. Would such an exercise support John 
Coatsworth's idea that the long-run benefits of independence were far larger 
than its costs? 
A final word deserves inclusion in the agenda for quantitative research on 
Latin America's economic performance over 1820-70. Trends in population, 
urbanization, literacy, and wages, together with trade and fiscal revenues 
and expenditures per head, are correlated with economic growth and could 
be reasonably reconstructed for Latin American countries. Gathering such 
data will allow us to assess economic performance across countries. Prelim-
inary findings about literacy, utbanization, and life expectancy suggest that 
some advances, though unevenly distributed, took place in the half century 
after independence.128 
(28 Cf. Paul Bairoch, Cities and Economic Development. From the Dawn o/History to the Present (Chicago, 
1988); and Carlos Newland, "La educaci6n elemental en Hispanoam~rica: Desde la independencia 
hasta la centralizaci6n de los sistemas educativos nacionales," Hispanic American Historical Review 
71, 2 (1991): 335-64. 
